Constitutional Law--When Push Comes to Shove: the Newsman\u27s Privilege Versus the Criminal Defendant\u27s Right to Compulsory Process by Swingle, Morley
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 44 
Issue 4 Fall 1979 Article 9 
Fall 1979 
Constitutional Law--When Push Comes to Shove: the Newsman's 
Privilege Versus the Criminal Defendant's Right to Compulsory 
Process 
Morley Swingle 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Morley Swingle, Constitutional Law--When Push Comes to Shove: the Newsman's Privilege Versus the 
Criminal Defendant's Right to Compulsory Process, 44 MO. L. REV. (1979) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss4/9 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. A rule of this type would
allow attorneys engaged in the multistate practice of law to appearpro hac
vice on a regular basis. It would limit appearances only if a judge deter-
mined that because of the frequency of appearance, the attorney was in
reality a local practitioner.
The Flynt decision has sacrificed substantial rights of both litigants
and attorneys for minor state interests. It is not clear at this time how far-
reaching the decision will be. Those jurisdictions that have previously
denied pro hac vice appearances only for good cause may continue to do
so. However, it will be with the knowledge that the Supreme Court has
held that a hearing is a privilege that may be revoked at any time. It is clear
that the Supreme Court has reaffirmed state power over all attorneys
engaged in the multistate practice of law. If states choose to exercise this
power by letting economic and administrative interests take precedence
over providing the best legal services available, the consequences may be
serious. Needed changes must be made or inequitable decisions such as
Flynt will be common.
ScOTTJ. GOLDSTEIN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-WHEN
PUSH COMES TO SHOVE: THE
NEWSMAN'S PRIVILEGE VERSUS
THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT'S
RIGHT TO COMPULSORY PROCESS
In re Farber'
In 1965 and 1966 thirteen people died in a NewJersey hospital under
unexplained and peculiar circumstances. An investigation was made at
the time by local authorities, but after they satisfied themselves that no
criminal action was involved, the matter was dropped.2 In the summer of
1975, however, The New York Times received a letter suggesting that the
deaths ten years earlier had been intentionally caused by a doctor.3 A
1. 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 598 (1978).
2. White, Why the Jailing of Farber Terrifies Me, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26,
1978, § 6 (Magazine), at 27.
3. Address by Myron Farber, MidwestJournalism Conference, in St. Louis(Feb. 10, 1979).
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Times reporter named Myron Farber was assigned to the story and began
looking into the situation. The ensuing articles Farber wrote about a doc-
tor who had been killing patients by injecting them with a muscle relaxant
prompted a prosecutor to reopen the investigation. 4 Shortly thereafter,
Dr. Mario E. Jascalevich was charged with murdering five patients. 5
After what was ultimately the longest trial of a single criminal defen-
dant in the history of the United States, 6 Dr. Jascalevich was acquitted by a
unanimous verdict after only three hours of jury deliberation.7 The
significance of the Farber case is not found in the acquittal of Dr.
Jascalevich, however, but in the constitutional issues that were raised when
Jascalevich's lawyer, in the middle of the trial, asked a county judge to
issue subpoenas duces tecum to Farber and The New York Times. The
defense sought certain materials compiled by the reporter, including notes
and recordings of interviews with some two hundred people., The judge
ordered instead that the materials be submitted to him for an in camera
inspection to determine whether the information was sufficiently relevant
to warrant revelation to the defense.
Farber and The New York Times refused to supply the subpoenaed
material, claiming a newsman's privilege under both the first amendment 9
and the NewJersey "shield statute."' 0 Their defense was rejected and both
4. White, supra note 2, at 27; Dworkin, The Rights of Myron Farber, THE
NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, Oct. 26, 1978, at 36 ("[Farber] accumulated a
great deal of information not previously available, and it is not disputed that this
information was the proximate cause of the indictment.").
5. White, supra note 2, at 70. The number of murders charged was later
reduced to three. The prosecution speculated that Jascalevich's motive had been
to discredit other doctors at the hospital who had been challenging his authority
as chief surgeon. Time, Nov. 6, 1978, at 48.
6. Farber, supra note 3. The trial lasted 34 weeks. White, supra note 2, at
70.
7. Time, Nov. 6, 1978, at 48.
8. Farber described the subpoena:
They wanted all notes, all tapes, all recordings, all pictures, all
everything from a list of some two hundred or so people. The subpoena
made absolutely no distinction between confidential or nonconfidential
materials, it made no showing of necessity, it was the most vague kind of
thing you can imagine. And it was a huge massive subpoena and it was a
subpoena that the Reporters' Committee in Washington later called the
broadest subpoena ever served on an American newsman.
Farber, supra note 3.
9. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press .... U.S. CONST. amend. I.
10. A shield statute gives a newsman a privilege not to disclose confidential
sources of information. The twenty-six state shield statutes vary, some giving
more protection than others. See note 26 infra. NewJersey's shield statute is said
to be as strongly worded as any in the country. 78 N.J. at 270, 394 A.2d at 835. It
reads in part as follows:
A person... employed by news media for the purpose of gathering...
news for the general public.., has a privilege to refuse to disclose, in any
legal or quasi-legal proceeding or before any investigative body, in-
2
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were found in contempt of court." Following a complex of proceedings,
the Supreme Court of New Jersey eventually granted motions for leave to
appeal and for direct certification.1 2
The decision handed down by the NewJersey court will have a signifi-
cant impact on the newsman's privilege and constitutional law. The
Farber opinion contains three very important holdings: (1) a newsman
has no first amendment privilege to refuse to produce information for an
in camera inspection, even though confidential sources may thereby be
divulged; (2) a newsman's privilege guaranteed by a state shield statute
must fall when it clashes with a criminal defendant's right to compel pro-
duction of witnesses under the sixth amendment; and (3) when such a con-
flict occurs, a newsman is entitled to a preliminary determination by the
trial judge that the information sought by the defense is reasonably likely
to be material, relevant, necessary to the defense, and unavailable from
any less intrusive source. If the elements of relevancy and unavailability ex-
ist, a hearing, including an in camera inspection of the materials, is re-
quired to determine whether the newsman must ultimately turn the
materials over to the defendant. Each of these holdings is controversial,
and each may have a far-reaching effect on this area of the law.
cluding, but not limited to, any court, grand jury, petit jury, ad-
ministrative agency, the Legislature or legislative committee, or
elsewhere:
a. The source, author, means, agency or person from or through
whom any information was procured ....
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (West Supp. 1978) (set out in full at 78 N.J. 269
n.2, 394 A.2d 335 n.2).
11. A fine of $100,000 was imposed on the Times, and Farber was ordered
to serve six months in jail and to pay $1,000. Additionally, compliance was sought
by the imposition of a $5,000 penalty on the Times for each day that elapsed until
the materials were produced. Farber actually went to jail for forty days and the
Times eventually paid $300,000 in fines. Farber never did turn over the informa-
tion he considered confidential. Farber, supra note 3.
12. The procedure is described in the majority opinion:
Appellants' initial motion for direct certification to this Court was
denied. The Attorney General, designated by the Court to prosecute the
contempt charges against the appellants, moved before the Appellate
Division for a remand in order that the trial court might determine
whether the news media privilege, asserted by appellants throughout
these proceedings, had been waived. This motion was denied and an ap-
peal was taken to this Court. In response to an inquiry by the Court, the
Attorney General filed a letter which contained, inter alia, a motion for
direct certification.
The Attorney General's motions for leave to appeal and for direct
certification were granted as was the appellants' motion for direct cer-
tification.
78 N.J. at 265, 394 A.2d at 332-33. Also, it may be important to note that two
separate justices of the United States Supreme Court denied Farber's motion for a
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The first holding in Farber, that a newsman's privilege to refrain from
revealing confidential information does not emanate from the free
speech/free press clause of the first amendment, 13 is controversial because
it adopts the more restrictive of the two interpretations that have been
given the 1972 United States Supreme Court case, Branzburg v. Hayes.14
In Branzburg, three cases with virtually identical fact situations and issues
were joined.15 In each, a grand jury had subpoenaed a newsman and
ordered him to testify about crimes he had been permitted to witness as a
result of promises of confidentiality. Each newsman claimed that the free
speech/free press clause of the first amendment provided a privilege to
refuse to reveal confidential information and sources. The reporters fur-
ther contended that the ability of the press to gather information would be
impaired if sources who wished to remain anonymous knew that a
newsman could be forced to reveal his identity.' 6 The Branzburg Court,
however, held that requiring newsmen to appear and testify before grand
juries does not abridge the freedom of speech and press guarantees of the
first amendment.' 7
13. The Farber majority stated:
Appellants . . . contend . . . that this privilege to remain silent with
respect to confidential information and the sources of such information
emanates from the "free speech" and "free press" clauses of the First
Amendment .... In our view the Supreme Court of the United States
has clearly rejected this claim and has squarely held that no such First
Amendment right exists.
78 N.J. at 265, 394 A.2d at 333.
One of the Farber dissents reinforced this interpretation by stating: "I
subscribe to the [majority's] view that the newsman's privilege is not predicated on
the First Amendment." 78 N.J. at 295, 394 A.2d at 348. In fact, a New Jersey
court had already interpreted Branzburg as allowing no constitutional protection
to newsmen for confidentiality of their sources. In re Bridge, 120 N.J. Super. 460,
295 A.2d 3 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 991 (1973).
14. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
15. In one situation, a newsman had interviewed several individuals who
used marijuana, and had watched them make hashish. After promising them
confidentiality, he wrote an article about the drug situation in the town. In
another, after promising not to reveal what he saw or heard, a newsman was
allowed to come inside a Black Panther headquarters on the night a police raid
was expected. While inside the headquarters, he was believed to have learned in-
formation concerning instances of arson and other turmoil that were occurring in
the area. In the third situation, a black newsman had spent over a year winning
the trust of the Black Panther Party and had developed a working relationship
with the militant group during a time when a Panther leader had made a public
speech declaring the intent of the group to kill then President Richard Nixon.
16. 408 U.S. at 728-36 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (Justice Stewart lists the
surveys and affidavits provided to the Branzburg Court, all of which indicate that
a severe chilling effect would occur.).
17. Five justices joined in the majority opinion, although one of them,
Justice Powell, added a separate concurrence making Branzburg difficult to in-
terpret. See Eckhardt & McKey, Caldero v. Tribune Publishing Co.: Substantive
and Remedial Aspects of First Amendment Protection for a Reporter's Confiden- 4
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Courts and commentators who have analyzed Branzburg disagree
whether the Court concluded that no constitutional newsman's privilege
exists to refuse information to the judiciary,1 8 or whether the Court
recognized a limited privilege.1 9 The majority in Farber seemed to favor
tial Sources, 14 IDAHo L. REV. 21, 70 (1977) ("Justice Powell's concurring opin-
ion has been characterized as 'opaque' and 'enigmatic' and like the rest of the case
has generated speculation and differing interpretations.") (footnotes omitted).
New York University Professor Ronald Dworkin has written:
The Supreme Court's decision in Branzburg v. Hayes, though its full
force is debatable, plainly held that a reporter may be forced to reveal
his sources when that information would be crucial to a defendant's case,
as determined by a trial judge. So even now reporters cannot, or should
not, flatly promise an informer confidentiality. Any such promise must
be qualified, if the reporter is scrupulous, by the statement that under
certain circumstances, not entirely defined by previous court decisions,
and impossible to predict in advance, a court may legally compel
disclosure.
Dworkin, supra note 4, at 35.
18. United States v. Liddy, 354 F. Supp. 208, 214 (D.D.C. 1972) ("[W]ith
the Supreme Court's decision of Branzburg it may be said that a right to gather
the news has been explicitly acknowledged. While acknowledging this corollary
right, however, the Court rejected the claim that such a right implies a privilege
to protect the identity of news sources."); Caldero v. Tribune Pub. Co., 98 Idaho
288, 293, 562 P.2d 791, 797, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 930 (1977) ("Our reading of
Branzburg is to the effect that no newsman's privilege against disclosure of con-
fidential sources founded on the First Amendment exists in an absolute or
qualified version.") (strong dissent contra); DowJones & Co. v. Superior Ct., 364
Mass. 317, 320, 303 N.E.2d 847, 849 (1973) ("In short, we are asked to rule thatjournalists have a qualified privilege to refuse to reveal confidential information
which is admittedly relevant to court proceeding. We adhere to our prior holding
that the First Amendment imports no such privilege, qualified or absolute ....
[citing Branzburg]"); In re Bridge, 120 N.J. Super. 460, 462, 295 A.2d 3, 6
(1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 991'(1973) ("In Branzburg the Court laid down a
broad rule that the First Amendment accords a newspaperman no privilege
against appearing before a grand jury and answering questions as to either the
identity of his news sources or information which he has received in confidence.");
Note, 10 IDAHo L. REV. 235, 244 (1974) ("Branzburg has, for the moment, put to
rest any claim by journalists to a testimonial privilege grounded on the First
Amendment.").
19. Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 978 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd on other
grounds, 99 S. Ct. 1635 (1979) ("This court has elaborated on the privilege
established by Branzburg") (strong dissent contra); Baker v. F. & F. Inv., 470
F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973) ("The Court inBranz-
burg.., applied traditional First Amendment doctrine, which teaches that con-
stitutional rights secured by the First Amendment cannot be infringed absent a
'compelling' or 'paramount' state interest.., and found such an overriding in-
terest in the investigation of crime by the grand jury which '[secures] the safety of
the person and the property of the citizen.' "); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,
563 F.2d 433, 437 (10th Cir. 1977) ("[T]he [Branzburg] Court's discussion in both
the majority opinion of Justice White and the concurring opinion of Justice
Powell recogniz[ed] a privilege which protects information given in confidence to
a reporter . "); Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631, 636 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
788 [Vol. 44
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417 U.S. 938 (1974) ("[I]t appears to us that Branzburg, in language if not in
holding, left intact, insofar as civil litigation is concerned, the approach.., that
the court will look to the facts on a case-by-case basis in the course of weighing the
need for testimony in question against the claims of the newsman that the public's
right to know is impaired.") (footnotes omitted); Zerilli v. Bell, 458 F. Supp. 26,
28 (D.D.C. 1978) ("The compelled disclosure of journalist sources clearly im-
pinges on the First Amendment, as it undeniably jeopardizes a journalist's ability
to obtain information on a confidential basis."); Anderson v. Nixon, 444 F. Supp.
1195, 1198-99 (D.D.C. 1978) ("The newsman's privilege is a 'fundamental per-
sonal right' well founded in the First Amendment . . . . [citing Branzburg]
Generally speaking, the privilege protects the newsman from disclosing sources.
But the privilege is a qualified one: where sources have relevant information that
the interests of justice require be disclosed, and the need is compelling, an obliga-
tion may be placed on the newsman to reveal sources in spite of an implied or ac-
tual prior pledge of confidentiality."); Loadholtz v. Fields, 389 F. Supp. 1299,
1302 (M.D. Fla. 1975) (interpreting Branzburg as holding that news gathering
qualifies for first amendment protection, and thus in civil suit plaintiff cannot get
source from newsman unless plaintiff has compelling need); Winegard v.
Oxberger, 258 N.W.2d 847, 850 (Iowa 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905
(1978) ("The foregoing [excerpt from Branzburg] effectively negates Winegard's
claim to the effect there is no such thing as a constitutionally based newsperson's
privilege . . . .Although this court is persuaded there exists a fundamental
newsperson privilege we are equally satisfied it is not absolute or unlimited.");
State v. Sandstrom, 224 Kan. 573, 574, 581 P.2d 812, 814 (1978), cert. denied, 99
S. Ct. 1265 (1979) ("We believe a newsperson has a limited privilege of confiden-
tiality of information and identity of news sources, although such does not exist by
statute or common law. The United States Supreme Court recognized the
privilege in Branzburg v. Hayes'... ."); State v. St. Peter, 132 Vt. 266, 269-70,
315 A.2d 254, 255 (1974) ("[T]he language and attitude of the Branzburg majori-
ty does not indicate an entire absence of concern for the news-gathering function
so relevant to the full exercise of the First Amendment .... Even more notewor-
thy, the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Powell suggests that the First Amend-
ment supports enough of a privilege in newsgatherers to require a balancing be-
tween the ingredients of freedom of the press and the obligation of citizens, when
called upon, to give relevant testimony relating to criminal conduct."); Brown v.
Commonwealth, 214 Va. 755, 757, 204 S.E.2d 429, 431, cert. denied, 419 U.S.
966 (1974) ("We believe that, as a news-gathering mechanism, a newsman's
privilege of confidentiality of information and identity of his source is an impor-
tant catalyst to the free flow of information guaranteed by the freedom of press
clause of the First Amendment. Unknown at common law, it is a privilege related
to the First Amendment and not a First Amendment right, absolute, universal,
and paramount to all other rights. The Supreme Court has held that the privilege
must yield to the government's right to investigate and indict by grand jury
.. *. [citing Branzburg]") (the court did not require disclosure of reporter's
source because criminal defendant had not made a showing that identification of
the source was material); Zelenka v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 601, 617, 266 N.W.2d 279,
286 (1978); Eckhardt & McKey, supra note 17, at 23 ("Since Branzburg, a large
(and rapidly growing) number of courts have given virtually unanimous endorse-
ment to the principle that, absent a compelling public or private justification,
any attempt to compel disclosure of confidential sources violates the first amend-
ment."); Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing Qualified Prizlege
for Newsmen, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 709, 741 (1975) ("It seems clear that five of the
nine justices in Branzburg would not require a reporter's testimony in every in-
stance; thus they granted a 'qualified newsman's privilege.' ").
6
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 4 [1979], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.ed /mlr/v l44/iss4/9
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
the "no privilege" interpretation, 20 expressly stating that it undertook no
balancing of the societal interests involved. 21 Courts which interpret
Branzburg as acknowledging a limited privilege weigh and balance the in-
terests of the parties on a case-by-case basis. 22 Prior to the Farber decision,
most recent cases which had considered the issue adopted the view of a
limited constitutional privilege to refuse to disclose confidential informa-
tion. 23 The Farber court's departure from that stance may well be a
foreshadow of cases to come. 24 If Farber's holding that a newsman has no
20. See note 13 supra. It could be argued, however, that the majority opin-
ion did not categorically deny a newsman's first amendment privilege to refuse to
disclose confidential sources. Under this narrow reading of Farber, the court
could be viewed as saying only that the journalist does not have a constitutional
privilege to refuse to disclose sources when his claimed privilege conflicts with the
sixth amendment right of a criminal to compulsory process. Under such a
reading, Farber could be seen as recognizing a qualified newsman's privilege. In
any event, Farber clearly stands for the proposition that when a criminal defen-
dant's right to compulsory process of witnesses conflicts with the newsman's claim
of privilege, the newsman will not be protected by a constitutional privilege.
21. 78 NJ. at 268, 394 A.2d at 334.
22. E.g., State v. Sandstrom, 224 Kan. 573, 576, 581 P.2d 812, 815 (1978),
cert. denied sub nom. Pennington v. Kansas, 99 S. Ct. 1265 (1979); Eckhardt &
McKey, supra note 17, at 108 ("All of the courts recognizing first amendment
protection against disclosure have employed some form of balancing test.").
23. See authorities cited notes 18 & 19supra; Goodale, supra note 18, at 742
("An examination of the surprising number of cases decided in the two-year
period since Branzburg provides an insight into the practicability and viability of
a qualified newsman's privilege. Although counting noses is not persuasive, a ma-jority recognize a qualified privilege .... ). See also Eckhardt & McKey, supra
note 17, at 24, 63-64, 79, 97.
24. One observer has stated:
A clear trend, however, seems to be developing: that the press, having
failed to convince judges of the direct linkage between gathering news
and publishing news can no longer rely on receiving constitutional pro-
tection for the investigation and editorial processes. The final pro-
duct-the newspaper article or editorial, the television broadcast-may
be protected, but the methods used to seek out and produce that end
product are not.
Bolbach, The Farber Case: What Does It Mean For Freedom of the Press?, THE
CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Nov. 29, 1978, at 1158.
The Farber case would have presented the United States Supreme Court with
the perfect opportunity to state categorically whether a newsman has any first
amendment privilege to refuse to disclose confidential sources. Most commen-
tators feel newsmen are fortunate that the Court denied certiorari. "From a jour-
nalist's point of view, it may be just as well that this court chose to duck the Farber
case, given the cold shoulder the .Justices have turned toward press claims of
special privilege in recent decisions." Time, Dec. 11, 1978, at 68. "It seems
... clear.., that the present Court is even less willing than the Branzburg Court
to recognize any constitutional protections afforded newgathering." Bolbach,
supra at 1155. "When it comes to decisions regarding the press, the Nixonburger
Court's generally chilly attitude-and Burger's personal loathing of the
media-has become increasingly apparent. This includes its decision not to
decide the case involving New York Times reporter Myron Farber . . . . The
[Vol. 44
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privilege predicated on the first amendment25 is accepted, a newsman in a
state without a shield statute26 will enjoy no privilege at all; no such
privilege is found at common law.
27
It is an elementary principle of federal supremacy that a state statute
must yield when it conflicts with the Constitution. 2 Nonetheless, the se-
cond holding of the New Jersey court that a state shield statute must bow
when it comes into conflict with a criminal defendant's sixth amendment
right is controversial because it involves the application of a relatively new
development in constitutional law to a fresh fact situation. The Farber in-
terpretation of the sixth amendment 29 as granting a criminal defendant
the right to force disclosure of a reporter's source is one that had not
previously been definitively expressed.3 0 In fact, the Supreme Court had
ominous silence was accurately interpreted by Columbia law professor Benno
Schmidt: 'When journalists rely on the First Amendment in these cases, they'd
better face the fact that they aren't going to get much help from the Supreme
Court.' " Sherrill, Injustices of the Burger Court, Playboy, April 1979, at 120,
230. These views are supported by the fact that in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436
U.S. 547, 566 (1978), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its belief that confidential
sources will not dry up if reporters can be forced to reveal their identities:
Nor are we convinced, any more than we were in Branzburg ... that
confidential sources will disappear and that the press will suppress news
because of fears of warranted searches. Whatever incremental effect
there may be in this regard if search warrants, as well as subpoenas, are
permissible in proper circumstances, it does not make a constitutional
difference in our judgment.
25. New York University Professor Ronald Dworkin notes that there are
policy reasons for allowing newsmen confidentiality of their sources, but no con-
stitutional privilege. Because this is not a clash between the sixth and first amend-
ments, "[t]he rhetoric of the popular debate over Farber, which supposes that the
press has rights that must be 'balanced' against the defendant's rights, is pro-
foundly misleading." Dworkin, supra note 4, at 35.
26. The twenty-six states that currently have shield statutes are listed in Com-
ment, Search of the Newsroom: The Battle for a Reporter's Privilege Moves to
New Ground, 44 Mo. L. REV. 297, 297 n.2 (1979). Missouri has no shield statute
at this time.
27. United States v. Liddy, 354 F. Supp. 208, 214 (D.D.C. 1972); State v.
Sandstrom, 224 Kan. 573, 574, 581 P.2d 812, 814 (1978), cert. denied sub nom.
Pennington v. Kansas, 99 S. Ct. 1265 (1979); Brown v. Commonwealth, 214 Va.
755, 757, 204 S.E.2d 429, 431 (1974); Note, 11 DuQ. L. REV. 657, 659 (1973)
("Any attempt to assert a common law privilege of a right to confidence has never
met with success.") (footnotes omitted).
28. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
29. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.. . to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor .... U.S. CONST.
amend. VI.
30. Several commentators have speculated, however, that even there were
a constitutional privilege for a newsman not to disclose his sources, this privilege
would yield to a criminal defendant's sixth amendment rights. Guest & Stanzler,
The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 Nw.
U.L. REV. 18, 50 (1969); Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 146 (1972); Tinling, Newsman's Privilege: A Survey of the Law in
California, 4 PAC. L.J. 880, 882 (1973); Note, Piercing the Newsman's Shield:
1979]
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not directly construed the sixth amendment compulsory process clause un-
til 1967 when it decided Washington v. Texas.3 1
In that case, a Texas statute declaring that persons charged as co-
participants in a crime could not testify in favor of each other was in issue,
and the plaintiff and a witness had both been charged with the murder of
an acquaintance. At the time of defendant's trial, the witness had already
been convicted, and if allowed to take the stand, he would have testified
that he, not the defendant, had committed the crime. The Supreme Court
found the statute unconstitutional on grounds that it denied the defendant
his sixth amendment right to compulsory process. The Court said:
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and compel their at-
tendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a
defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as
well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where the
truth lies. Just as an accused has the right to confront the prosecu-
tion's witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony he
has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense.3 2
The Farber opinion was brief in its analysis of a defendant's right
under the compulsory process clause to ascertain the names of anonymous
sources from whom a reporter has derived information. The court simply
wrote, "[Jascalevich] claims to come within the favor of [this] constitu-
tional provision-which he surely does.133 The court also pointed out that
The Supreme Court and the States Assess Privilege Legislation, 3 CAP. U.L.
REV. 53, 76 (1974).
31. 388 U.S. 14 (1967). Before Washington, the Supreme Court had men-
tioned the compulsory process clause only five times-twice as dictum, and three
times when it was found unnecessary to construe the clause. Westen, Confronta-
tion and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases,
91 HARV. L. REV. 567, 586 n.47 (1978). The compulsory process clause should
not be confused with the confrontation clause, which has been construed many
times. Id. at 586.
32. 388 U.S. at 19.
33. 78 N.J. at 272, 394 A.2d at 336. The following hypotheticals may make
the holding of the case clearer:
Hypothetical 1: Mysterious deaths at hospital. Reporter talked to hospital
staff and patients and was told that Dr. X had committed the murders. Reporter
wrote story about the murders. Prosecution subpoenas reporter to disclose the
sources and information. Reporter claims privilege. Result: reporter wins
because the sixth amendment affords rights to an accused, but not to a pro-
secutor. 78 N.J. at 273, 394 A.2d at 337.
Hypothetical 2: Mysterious deaths at hospital. Reporter talked to hospital
staff and patients after deaths and wrote story about deaths. Dr. X, who feels he
has been defamed, sues reporter and newspaper and seeks to discover the
reporter's source. Reporter claims privilege. Result: reporter wins since shield
statute provides privilege, and the non-criminal plaintiff seeking the identity of
the source has no sixth amendment right to the information.
Hypothetical 3: Mysterious deaths at hospital. Reporter had been in the
hospital and had seen Dr. X inject patients with fatal dose of drug. Reporter
writes story about what he saw. Reporter claims privilege when prosecution sub-
poenas him to testify as to what he saw. Result: by the terms of many shield
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Jascalevich sought to use the evidence to prepare and present his defense.3 4
Discovering the identity of a reporter's anonymous source could indeed
prove to be very valuable to the defendant. The anonymous source might
prove to be a witness who would testify that the defendant was innocent,
and that the reporter had twisted the source's version of the facts. It is
possible, too, that an anonymous source never existed, other than in the
imagination of the newsman.
Farber's third holding that a newsman is entitled to a hearing when a
privilege pursuant to a state shield statute clashes with the constitutional
right of compulsory process is somewhat confusing. The problem is caused
by use of the terms "preliminary determination"3 5 and "hearing," very
similar concepts but here designating two distinct required events.
Newsmen do not like the Farber result 6 because, they say, there is no hear-
ing before a reporter must turn the material over to the judge; there is only
an ill-defined preliminary determination. The preliminary determination
is merely a finding by a trial judge that a criminal defendant has shown by
a preponderance of the evidence that it is likely that the information
sought by the subpoena will be material, necessary, relevant to his defense,
and unavailable from any less intrusive source. In fact, the majority and
both dissents agreed that this procedure should be required.3 7 The quarrel
is whether this determination should be made by the criminal defendant,
the newsman, or the judge. A criminal defendant is entitled to discover
relevant information that he needs for his defense, but he is not constitu-
tionally entitled to go on a fishing expedition. 8 Similarly, a reporter
should not be the one to determine the scope of his own privilege.3 9 It is a
statutes, including New Jersey's, the reporter must testify because he was an
eyewitness to an act involving physical violence or property damage. In addition,
some courts that recognize a constitutional newsman's privilege have held that
this privilege protects only sources, and not reporters who have been eyewitnesses
to crimes. E.g., People v. Dan, 41 App. Div. 2d 687, 688 (N.Y. 1973) (newsmen
eyewitnessed killings during Attica prison riots).
34. But see Dworkin, supra note 4, at 35: "[I]t has been suggested that
[Jascalevich's lawyer] made his request [for the confidential information] not
because he believed he would discover anything useful to his client but because he
hoped that the request would be refused, so that he could later claim, on appeal,
that the trial was unfair."
35. Also called "threshold determination." 78 N.J. at 276, 394 A.2d at 338.
36. Farber, supra note 3.
37. 78 N.J. at 292, 394 A.2d at 346-47 (Pashman, J., dissenting), 352
(Handler, J., dissenting). What the majority and the dissents do not agree upon is
whether it was appropriate for the New Jersey Supreme Court to rule that even
though the trial judge had not made the required preliminary determination, the
appellate court should affirm ot the ground that the facts showed the result of
such a determination to be quite inescapable.
38. The Farber majority stated: lIT]his opinion is not to be taken as a
license for a fishing expedition in every criminal case where there has been in-
vestigative reporting, nor as permission for an indiscriminate rummaging
through newspaper files." 78 N.J. at 277, 394 A.2d at 339.
39. The concurring judge in Farber proclaimed: "[R]espondent's claim to a
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judge familiar with legal concepts of preponderance of evidence,
relevance, materiality, and compelling need, who should view the
material and rule whether a defendant shall have it.40 A preliminary deter-
mination is really only a safeguard to ensure that a judge considers such
issues before production is ordered, and a requirement that a record of
findings be made for appellate review.
Assuming the defendant satisfies the court that the requested material
passes the preliminary determination test, the hearing thereafter would be
to determine the relevance, materiality, and overbreadth of the evidence
requested by the subpoena. 41 However, it must be emphasized that an in
camera inspection comes as a part of this hearing. 42 Therefore, the judge
has available the materials themselves as a basis for resolution of these
issues, so he will no longer have to "ponder the relevance of the unknown"
or make his decision "in a vacuum."4 3 Newsmen feel that they should not
final adjudication without an in camera scrutiny by the court upon which to base
its decision would project the absurd proposition that the press, and not the
courts, should be the final arbiter of the constitutional mandate." 78 N.J. at 282,
394 A.2d at 341.
An analogy may be drawn to United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 638 (1974), in
which the Court recognized a qualified privilege of confidentiality for conversa-
tions the President has with his advisors. The President, like the press in this case,
wanted to be the one who decided what was confidential. The Court held,
however, that the judiciary, not the President, was the final arbiter of a claim of
executive privilege. 418 U.S. at 706.
40. Reporters, however, do not like the thought of turning over their con-
fidential materials to a judge. Farber said:
In twelve years reporting at the Times, I have never encountered a per-
son who provided me information in confidence who said to me, 'If push
comes to shove, you can show it to a judge and let him be the arbiter of
whether it is going to be passed on. Never have Il When people tell you
that this is between us, this is in confidence, they mean precisely that.
Farber, supra note 3.
A recent statement by Theodore H. White, journalist and author, gives some
indication of the attitudes held by newsmen which give rise to reporters' reluc-
tance to give confidential information to judges:
[E]very veteran reporter knows that not all judges are spiritual descen-
dants of Holmes, Brandeis and Warren. All too many judges, wrapped
in the black robes of court, are graduate politicians, neither scholars nor
Solons; and, as one descends the hierarchy from the Federal to state and
local levels, one finds more and more of them are hacks. Appointments
to the bench, in NewJersey as elsewhere, are born of politics; they are in-
fluenced by ethnic and racial groups, by labor and business interests, by
political clubhouse connections, snobberies of bar associations and law
schools-occasionally even by the Mafia. To extend to all these men,
through the precedent of the Farber case, the same right to squeeze in-
formation, confidences and hearsay out of reporters converts the Sixth
Amendment into an institution of judicial extortion.
White, supra note 2, at 78.
41. 78 N.J. at 274, 394 A.2d at 337.
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be forced to turn over their information for even an in camera examina-
tion. The criminal defendant, on the other hand, wants all of the informa-
tion without any editing by the judge. The Farber court, convinced that ir-
reparable damage would be caused to newsmen if confidential informa-
tion were available indiscriminately to the criminal defendant, settled on a
compromise solution whereby the reporter must turn over his materials to
a judge so the judge can decide whether the reporter has to turn the
materials over to the defendant.
The three holdings of In re Farber will certainly have an effect on the
law of newsman's privilege, but that effect will not necessarily be entirely
negative. Although courts in other states are not bound by Farber, the
most damaging blow inflicted to newsmen by the decision is its apparent
interpretation of the Branzburg case: the denial of a newsman's privilege
derived from the first amendment. Thus, in light of Farber, in states which
have no shield statutes and which similarly recognize no constitutional
newsman's privilege, newsmen are in danger of being subject to fishing ex-
peditions in both civil and criminal cases. 44 These states might require no
preliminary determination or hearing since the Farber court was convinc-
ed it should implement these protections only because of the strong
legislative policy evidenced by the shield statute. Without a constitutional
privilege, there is a real possibility that prosecutors could use newsmen as
an "investigative arm of the government."'4 , That is, prosecutors could
subpoena them every time a story was written about an illegal activity; it is
probable that in many cases the investigative reporter, who will probably
refuse to divulge the information, rather than the criminal suspect, would
be the first to go to jail. 4
In re Farber's holding that the compulsory process clause of the sixth
amendment triumphs over a testimonial privilege granted by a state shield
statute could prove to be a significant aspect of the opinion. Although the
court's holding was limited to the statutory newsman's privilege, other
testimonial privileges derive from comparable statutes.4 7 Soon, these may
44. In the hypotheticals supra note 33, assuming the incident occurs in a
state with no shield statute, the reporter would not be protected in any of the ex-
amples.
45. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
46. Eckhardt & McKey, supra note 17, at 131 ("[W]ith very few exceptions,
reporters have over the years preferred to accept even indefinite coercive jail
sentences ratier than to breach assurances of confidentiality.").
47. Indeed, of all the testimonial privileges, including lawyer-client,
accountant-client, doctor-patient, priest-penitant, and husband-wife, only the
privilege against self-incrimination comes from the Constitution. Some
testimonial privileges have always been merely statutory. Examples are the
physician-patient privilege, Klinge v. Lutheran Medical Center, 518 S.W.2d 157,
164 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974), the accountant-client privilege, RSMo § 326.151
(1978), and the priest-penitant privilege, 8J. WiGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2394, at 870
(McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). For a discussion of the testimonial privileges, see C.
MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 72-143 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972). Other privileges have
1979]
12
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 4 [1979], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss4/9
